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Abstract 
Job mobility and hours of work: the effect of Dutch legislation 
 
Previous research has pointed to the existence of hours constraints on the labour 
market: not all employees’ preferences with respect to the length of the working 
week seem to be fulfilled, and changes in the number of working hours often 
coincide with job mobility. In this paper, we test whether or not a recently 
introduced Dutch legislation providing employees with the right to adjust working 
hours within their job has reduced the correlation between changes in working 
hours and job mobility. We do this by implementing a difference-in-differences 
methodology to the job and hours mobility behaviour of Dutch workers prior and 
after the introduction of the new law. We find no evidence suggesting that this is 
indeed the case, regardless of gender. 
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1 Introduction 
A large amount of literature suggests that hour constraints are important 
determinants of job mobility: workers who are constrained in their labour supply 
are more likely to change job or to leave the labour market. Such evidence is 
discussed by Böheim and Taylor (2004) and Gielen (2009) for the UK, by Altonji 
and Paxson (1992) and Martinez-Granado (2005) for the US and by Euwals 
(2001) for the Netherlands. In this paper, we contribute to this literature by 
investigating whether or not legislation can contribute to the removal of working 
hour constraints.  
 The legislation we refer to is the Adjustment of Working Hours Act that was 
introduced in July 2000 by the Dutch government. The main objective of this Act 
is to facilitate employees’ adjustment of working hours: employees are given the 
right to adapt the length of their working week within their current job (see 
Section 2 for details). Such piece of legislation is not unique to the Netherlands 
since a similar Act also exists in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in the UK. This 
makes the Dutch results interesting to the international community. It is of 
particular interest as such new working hours policy could help mothers in the 
combination of paid employment and care (Dex and Joshi, 1999). The effect of 
the Adjustment of Working Hours Act is assessed using the difference-in-
differences methodology. We compare mobility patterns of workers in small firms 
– for which the obligations in the Act do not hold –and large firms before and after 
the introduction of the Act. Furthermore, we also compare the difference in 
mobility patterns of employees who are satisfied with their current number of 
working hours with that of those who are dissatisfied, before and after the 
introduction of the Act. 
 Our second contribution to the literature is that, contrary to previous 
research, we take the view that the choice for a job and the choice for a particular 
number of working hours are taking place simultaneously. Workers do not just 
‘choose’ a number of working hours and then a job that goes with it as is often 
assumed, but they consider job–hour packages. This is because jobs tend to come 
with a specific number of working hours. Hence, we assume that a utility 
maximising employee can choose to remain in the same job with the same number 
of working hours, to change working hours within the same job, to change job but 
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to keep the same number of working hours, to change both job and working hours 
or to withdraw from the labour market altogether. We model this job–hours choice 
set using a multinomial logit model. The model is estimated on longitudinal data 
of Dutch employees for the period 1986–2006.  
 Our main finding is that the association between changes in working hours 
and job mobility has not been altered by the aforementioned Act. We conclude 
that this type of legislation has little effect on removing hour constraints and argue 
why this is the case. 
 The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give a sketch of the Dutch 
labour market and its institutions. In Section 3 we review the literature on working 
hour preferences and job mobility. The empirical model and the data used for 
estimation are discussed in Section 4. The descriptive results and the model 
estimates are presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss our main findings.  
 
 
2 The Dutch labour market in international perspective 
2.1 High rate of part-time employment 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, most European Union (EU) countries have seen 
a significant growth in the proportion of part-timers in the total labour force. 
However, in no other country in the EU is part-time employment as widespread as 
it is in the Netherlands. According to Eurostat, 46.8% of the workforce was 
employed part-time in the Netherlands in 2007. The next highest rate is found in 
Germany (26%), closely followed by the UK (25.2%), Sweden (25%), and 
Denmark (24.1%). Although part-time work remains a predominant feature of 
female employment, a large share of the Dutch male labour force is working part-
time, compared to other countries. The large share of part-timers in the 
Netherlands today is the result of a combination of labour demand and supply 
factors. On the demand side, the advance in part-time employment can be 
explained by a change in attitude among employers who started to see its 
advantages in a context of extending operating hours and a growing service sector 
(Delsen et al., 2007). On the supply side the entry of married women in the labour 
force, and the increasing participation rate of mothers has also contributed greatly 
to the increase in part-time employment (Portegijs and Keuzenkamp, 2008). 
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Dutch labour market policy has contributed to the normalisation of part-time 
employment by introducing various measures to improve the legal position of part-
timers in the last decades. In the Netherlands, jobs with fewer than 35 hours per 
week are considered to be part-time jobs. In 1993, thresholds that related to the 
number of working hours were removed from entitlements to the statutory 
minimum wage and the minimum holiday allowance. Legislation in 1996 
elaborated on the subject, by prohibiting discrimination between employees based 
upon the number of working hours. This piece of legislation awards part-time 
employees an explicit right to equal treatment – pro rata – in areas negotiated by 
the social partners, such as wages, holiday pay and entitlements, bonuses and 
training. As a result, today, part-timers and full-timers enjoy similar conditions of 
employment in the Netherlands. Moreover, in many branches of industry – such as 
healthcare, the public sector, education and services – part-time work has become a 
normal and accepted phenomenon. In this respect the Dutch situation sharply 
contrasts to the situation in other countries, where part-time employment is often a 
form of marginal employment (Visser, 2002: 25).1  
2.2 A right to change the number of working hours 
With the legal position of part-timers being secured, the Dutch government turned 
its attention towards increasing participation through part-time employment in the 
1990s. One of the reasons for this is that part-time employment is seen as a means 
for both men and women to combine work and caring activities. It is in this 
context that the Adjustment of Working Hours Act (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur) 
came into force in July 2000. According to the Act, employees have the right to 
request an upward or downward adjustment of the number of working hours in 
their current job. Any employee who has been employed with his or her current 
employer for more than one year can make use of this legal right once every two 
years. Essentially, employers have to honour such requests unless precluded by 
pressing conflicting business interests. Although this does not imply that all 
requests have to be honoured, it does imply that employers have to justify refusals. 
Employees, however, are under no obligation to motivate their request. This 
 
1. Nevertheless, even in the Netherlands, part-timers seem to have fewer career prospects and fewer chances to 
enter management jobs than full-timers (Fouarge and Muffels, 2009). 
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difference in treatment of employers and employees shows that the legislator has 
taken side with workers in their effort to realise their desired number of working 
hours. In case the employer refuses to honour the employee’s request, the latter can 
turn to the judge. The available jurisprudence suggests that once an employee steps 
to court, the judge is more likely to pass a judgement in favour of the employee 
than in favour of the employer (Carmonier, 2003; Veldman, 2003). The Act is 
equally applicable to employees in the market and the public sector. Note, 
however, that the Act excludes organisations with less than ten employees, which 
are expected to develop their own arrangement. This differential treatment between 
small and large firms will be used to identify the effect of the law in our empirical 
analysis.  
 Such legislation is not unique to the Netherlands, which makes the study of 
its effects of interest to the international community. Within the European Union, 
comparable laws exist in Germany and the UK. The German Act on Part-time 
Work and Fixed-Term Contracts (Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete 
Arbeitsverträge) came into force in January 2001. The law introduced the right to 
switch from full-time to part-time, but the question whether or not this right is 
reversible is the subject of ongoing debate (Schmidt, 2001; Jacobs and Schmidt, 
2001; Burri et al., 2003). In the UK, parents of young children may request 
flexible working hours from their employer, but the scope of this right is less wide 
and conditions of entitlement are more rigid than in the Netherlands (EIRO, 
2003).  
 We conclude that there is a great amount of working hour flexibility in the 
Netherlands for three reasons. Firstly, the large share of part-time employment 
suggests that part-time jobs are readily available. Secondly, the legal position of 
part-time workers is well secured, preventing part-time jobs from being 
marginalised jobs. Finally, the Adjustment of Working Hours Act has removed 
formal barriers to transitions from full- to part-time employment and back. 
 
3 Labour supply preferences and hours restrictions 
Working hour preferences and working hour changes have been the subject of 
much research already. In their study of hour constraints Kahn and Lang (1992), 
for example, conclude that a substantial proportion of working males in the US 
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work fewer hours than they would like to, and they investigate possible 
explanations for this. The situation in Europe is somewhat different because there 
is a stronger preference to work fewer hours (Freeman and Schettkat, 2005). 
According to a study covering 15 EU member states and Norway, half of the 
workforce surveyed preferred to work fewer hours and 11 per cent preferred to 
work more hours (Bielenski et al., 2002: 43). However, almost two thirds of full-
timers assume that their current employer would not agree to let them work part-
time – ranging from 71 per cent in Austria to 44 per cent in Finland – while 
almost half of them say that working part-time would harm their career prospects – 
ranging from 55 per cent in Germany to 31 per cent in Denmark (Bielenski et al., 
2002: 57).  
 In their seminal contributions, Altonji and Paxson (1986, 1988, 1992) have 
studied adjustment of working hours of married women in the US. They 
distinguish between women who stay in their job and women who change 
employer. The authors conclude – using the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
– that working hours of married women are two to four times more variable when 
changing employer than when staying in the same job. Based upon the US 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Martinez-Granado (2005) finds that for 
prime aged males the variance of the change in hours is more than six times higher 
across jobs (defined as a change of employer) than within jobs. Both findings 
suggest that male and female employees in the US have difficulties adjusting 
working hours without changing employer. In addition, Böheim and Taylor 
(2004) find – using the British Household Panel Survey – that job changers in 
Great Britain are better able to adjust working hours in line with their preferences 
than those who stay in the same job. For the Netherlands, Euwals (2001) – using 
the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel covering the years prior to the introduction of 
the Adjustment of Working Hours Act – finds that flexibility of working hours 
within jobs is low among female employees. As a result, women who stay with the 
same employer have a much smaller chance of adjusting their working hours than 
women who change jobs.  
 Why are employees reluctant to request fewer or more working hours? 
Employees (especially male employees) think that their employer or their job are 
important obstacles in realising a preference for working a different number of 
working hours (Fouarge and Baaijens, 2006). They seem to fear that their 
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employer does not approve or to think that it is not possible in their job, although 
this may not objectively be the case. For employees in management positions it is 
often the norm to work full-time, which might form a barrier for them to request a 
reduction of the working week. Being employed full-time is also often seen as an 
indication of loyalty to the firm (Landers et al., 1996). It is possible that both 
employees and employers have such perceptions.  
 Although job mobility is not a bad thing in itself, job mobility that is solely 
induced by dissatisfaction with the number of working hours – rather than 
dissatisfaction with the job itself, or differences in productivity across jobs – is 
inefficient for at least three reasons. Firstly, job mobility involves search costs for 
the employee. Secondly, it involves search costs for the firm to replace the 
departing employee. Thirdly, it results in the loss of firm specific human capital.  
 If it is indeed the case that workers who wish to adapt their labour supply are 
more inclined to change job, then a piece of legislation that facilitates hours 
changes within the job should be beneficial to the economy. The new Dutch 
Adjustment of Working Hours Act is an interesting natural experiment for testing 
this. This, however, has never been done before. 
 
 
4 Data and empirical model 
The findings discussed in Section 3 point to the existence of hour constraints – or 
at least perceived hour constraints – on the labour market, which result in a strong 
association between hours change and job mobility: when an adjustment of hours 
takes place, it generally involves a job change. In the remainder of this paper we 
analyse this relationship between job mobility and changes in working hours in the 
context of the Dutch ‘part-time economy’, and we examine whether or not 
legislation does remove such restrictions. 
4.1 Data: OSA Labour Supply Panel 
To study the process of working hour adjustments and job mobility, we use 
longitudinal information from the OSA Labour Supply Panel. This is a panel of 
Dutch persons that is representative for the population aged 16 to 64. As of 1986, 
data are collected every other year among some 4,500 persons in more than 2,000 
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households. We use eleven waves of the panel covering the period 1986–2006. We 
selected employees aged 18 to 55. We exclude self-employed and young people 
who are employed but engaged in full time education. The data is organised as a 
person-period file, and the standard errors of our estimates are corrected for 
intragroup correlation. The estimation sample consists of some 3,800 working 
males and 2,900 working females.  
 The data include a wide range of information on demographic 
characteristics at the level of the individual and the household, human capital 
indicators, socio-economic characteristics and job characteristics. The data also 
include information on contractual and preferred working hours and job mobility. 
Contractual working hours refer to the number of working hours that employer 
and employee have agreed upon in the labour contract.2 The preference for 
working hours is assessed by asking employees for their preferred number of 
working hours. A comparison of contractual and preferred working hours reveals 
whether or not employees are satisfied with the length of their working week. From 
2000 on, however, respondents are asked directly whether they want to work more 
or fewer hours.3 This change in the questionnaire has had only a minor effect on 
the pattern of answers given, leading only to a sharper decrease in the proportion of 
employees stating they would prefer to work more hours, compared to other 
national sources (Beckers and van der Valk, 2005). This, however, is of no 
particular concern for the current study. Given the biennial nature of our data, we 
measure job mobility as a job change with the same employer or a change of 
employer between t and t + 2.  
4.2 Modelling hours changes and job mobility 
The standard neo-classical model of labour supply predicts that workers develop 
preferences for the number of hours they want to work and adapt their labour 
supply in accordance with those preferences. However, job offers tend to come 
with a set number of working hours. Therefore it is more realistic to assume that 
 
2. This excludes overtime hours because the Adjustment of Working Hours Act only applies to contractual 
working hours. Overtime is controlled for in the empirical model. 
3.  It is important to note that, in all years, respondents had to assume that their hourly wage and the labour 
supply of other household members remained unchanged when reporting their preferred number of working 
hours. It was made explicit that working fewer (more) hours implied a reduction (increase) in income.  
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workers search for job–hours combinations that best fit their preferences. For 
example, a dissatisfaction resulting from working more hours than the preferred 
number of working hours can be offset by the fact that the job is interesting or 
stimulating. It is also possible that the amenities of a particular job are 
compensated by lower levels of working hours. 
 The fact that we focus on the effects of legislation on working time changes 
is also a reason why we look at job–hour packages. Indeed, the Dutch Adjustment 
of Working Hours Act is not only expected to facilitate changes in the working 
hours, but also to reduce job mobility – in particular withdrawal from the labour 
market –resulting from dissatisfaction with respect to the number of working 
hours. 
 The labour market position of an individual i at time t is characterised by a 
given number of working hours in a particular job. In this paper, we are interested 
in the change in this labour market position – change of hours and/or change of 
job – between t and t + 2. A change of hours can mean either an increase or a 
decrease in the number of working hours (the Dutch Act aims at facilitating both).4 
Henceforth, at each time period, a utility maximising employee can choose:  
1) to remain in the same job with the same number of working hours (no job 
mobility/no change of hours);  
2) to change job but to keep the same number of working hours (job mobility/no 
change of hours); 
3) to change working hours within the same job (no job mobility/change of hours);  
4) to change both job and working hours (job mobility/change of hours);  
5) to withdraw from the labour market altogether (exit labour market). 
 
 
4.  In the model, a change in the number of working hours is defined as a change of at least 4 hours. This is not 
only done in order to account for small measurement errors, but also because it is assumed that small 
adjustments in the working hours are easily negotiable with the employer. Furthermore, this prevents collective 
working time reduction – the gradual reduction of the standard working week from 40 to 36 hours in the paste 
decades – to affect our results. However, replication of the estimation without this restriction shows that it does 
not affect our findings in any significant way.  
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Table 1 
Variables used in model and sample statistics
 Mean Standard 
deviation
Female (1 if yes) 0.407 0.491
Age 38.057 9.235
Household type: couple, no child jonger than 6 y.o. (1 if yes) 0.590 0.492
Household type: couple with child younger than 6 y.o. (1 if yes) 0.237 0.426
Household type: single (1 if yes) 0.173 0.378
Educational level: lower education (1 if yes) 0.376 0.484
Educational level: secondary education (1 if yes) 0.371 0.483
Educational level: high education/university (1 if yes) 0.252 0.434
Number of hours worked by partner (0 if no partner) 21.316 17.473
Hourly wage in constant 2006 prices (in logarithm) 2.017 0.435
Part-time job (working less than 35 hours per week) 
(1 if yes) 0.342 0.475
Does overtime work (1 if yes) 0.397 0.489
Permanent contract (1 if yes) 0.892 0.310
Managerial job (1 if yes) 0.647 1.191
Heavy duty (1 if yes) 0.337 0.473
Dissatisfied with the job (1 if yes) 0.091 0.287
Dissatisfied with number of hours (1 if yes) 0.279 0.449
Sector: Industry and energy (1 if yes) 0.161 0.368
Sector: Agriculture (1 if yes) 0.013 0.113
Sector: Construction (1 if yes) 0.062 0.241
Sector: Commerce, catering (1 if yes) 0.147 0.354
Sector: Transport (1 if yes) 0.066 0.249
Sector: Financial business services (1 if yes) 0.131 0.337
Sector: Other services (1 if yes) 0.050 0.218
Sector: Public sector (1 if yes) 0.109 0.311
Sector: Education (1 if yes) 0.091 0.287
Sector: Healthcare (1 if yes) 0.171 0.376
Firm size: 1-9 employees (1 if yes) 0.132 0.339
Firm size: 10-99 employees (1 if yes) 0.414 0.493
Firm size: >99 employees (1 if yes) 0.454 0.498
Time period: 1986-1994 (1 if yes) 0.413 0.492
Time period: 1994-2000 (1 if yes) 0.266 0.442
Time period: 2000-2006 (1 if yes) 0.321 0.467
Regional unemployment rate 6.665 2.015
 
We model this job–hours choice set using a multinomial logit model, where 
remaining in the same job with the same number of hours is treated as the 
reference. A similar modeling strategy is used by Gielen (2009). In the model, we 
include a number of control variables pertaining to individual characteristics (age, 
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educational level), household characteristics (household type, labour supply of 
partner)5, job characteristics (own labour supply, hourly wage rate, type of contract, 
sector of activity, firm size and dummy variables for managers, work involving 
heavy duty, overtime and dissatisfaction with work), and preference for working 
more of fewer hours. Table 1 reports summary statistics for these variables. The 
model is estimated for males and females separately. The reason for this is that the 
legislation tested here has a clear emancipatory component which is likely to have a 
larger effect on females’ labour market behaviour than of that of males.  
4.3 Identifying the effect of legislation: difference-in-differences 
estimator 
Our test of the effect of the Adjustment of Working Hours Act consists of a 
pre/post evaluation using the difference-in-differences methodology. Therefore, in 
addition to the aforementioned control variables, the model includes a number of 
time dummies. They distinguish the pre-Act period (prior to 2000) from the post-
Act period (2000–2006). Within the pre-Act period, we make a distinction 
between the period 1994–2000 and the years before because the second half of the 
nineties was marked by a sharp increase in the labour participation rate of females. 
The period 1994–2000 is used as reference period. To ensure our pre/post 
comparison is not affected by structural changes in the economy, the 
unemployment rate at the level of the twelve Dutch provinces is included among 
the regressors in order to catch business cycle effects. This implies that the time 
dummies capture changes that are not related to the business cycle.   
 Because the new Act does not apply to small firms, employees in small firms 
can be used as a control group in this study. We implement a difference-in-
differences estimator by introducing interactions between the period effects and the 
firm size. These interaction terms indicate whether or not the association between 
mobility and firm size has changed over the years. While mobility in small firms 
could be different from mobility in large firms, the assumption we make here is 
that this difference would have remained constant over time had the Act not come 
into force. Under the assumption that the Act has had an effect on employees’ 
 
5.  Although one could argue that partners labour supply is jointly determined, here, the labour supply of the 
partner is merely included as an additional control variable.  
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mobility patterns, we expect this cross-term to be positive for large firms for the ‘no 
job mobility/change of hours’ mobility. This would show that, compared to 
employees in small firms, employees in large firms find it easier to change their 
hours while remaining in their job after the law changed.  
 The covariates also include a dummy for workers who are dissatisfied with 
their actual number of working hours: they would like to either work more or 
fewer hours.6 Here again, we implement a difference-in-differences estimator by 
introducing interactions between period effect and dissatisfaction with the number 
of working hours. Under the assumption that the Act has had an effect on 
mobility, we would expect that, compared to workers who are satisfied with their 
working hours, dissatisfied employees more easily adapt their hours without having 
to change job after the introduction of the Act. Hence we expect a positive sign for 
the coefficient indicating dissatisfaction in the post-Act period. Furthermore, we 
expect that dissatisfied workers less often change their working hours and their job 
at the same time in the post-Act period. Finally, as it has been shown that 
employees who are dissatisfied with their hours are more likely to withdraw from 
the labour market (Böheim and Taylor, 2004), we expect this to be less the case in 
the post-Act period.7
 
 
5 Changes in working hours and job mobility 
5.1 Descriptive findings 
The patterns of hours mobility and job mobility between t and t + 2 for the 1986–
2006 period are depicted in Figure 1. The pattern of job mobility depicted in the 
figure follows the Dutch economy quite closely, with lower levels of job mobility in 
the periods 1992–1994 and 2002–2004 – both economic downturns – and 
increasing mobility in the years that followed. Flexibility in the length of the 
working week seems to follow this same pattern, with a two-year delay.  
 
 
6.   The difference between preferred and actual number of hours is at least 4 hours. 
7.   Attrition, which amounts to some 15% of the cases on a yearly basis, is in no way related to the variables of 
interest here such as the firm size or working time preferences. 
 Figure 1 
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Table 2 reports the job mobility–hours change patterns (as discussed in Section 4) 
for the pre and the post-Act periods. From the table it appears that changes of 
working hours within the job have become more frequent over the years. However, 
job changes involving a change in the length of the working week have not become 
less frequent. Finally, it can be noted that the percentage of prime aged workers 
exiting the labour market has decreased. 
 
Table 2 
Hours and job mobility patterns of Dutch employees, percentages, 1986–2006 
 1986–1994 1994–2000 2000–2006
No job mobility / no change of hours )1 57.9 60.6 58.0
Job mobility / no change of hours )1 19.6 16.8 17.3
No job mobility / change of hours 7.8 9.0 12.2
Job mobility /  change of hours 7.7 8.0 8.2
Exit from labour market 7.1 5.7 4.2
Total 100 
(n=7,591) 
100 
(n=4,844) 
100 
(n=5,561) 
1) No change or change is less than 4 hours. 
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In Table 3, the mobility patterns are depicted for employees working in small firms 
compared to employees working in medium and large sized firms. In the table the 
patterns in the pre-Act period (1994–2000) are compared to those in the post-Act 
period (2000–2006). The pre/post difference-in-differences in mobility patterns 
are computed taking employees in small firms as the reference. What the table 
shows is that employees in large firms are more likely to stay in the same job with 
the same number of hours, and that the relative difference compared to employees 
in small firms has increased between the two time periods. Furthermore, the table 
shows that while changing the number of working hours in the same job is more 
frequent in small firms, the frequency of such type of mobility has increased 
relatively more in medium and large sized firms as is shown by the difference-in-
differences estimator. This is in accordance with the effect one could expect from 
the Adjustment of Working Hours Act.  
 
Table 3 
Hours and job mobility patterns of Dutch employees in small sized (less than 10 employees) and 
medium and large sized firms (10 or more employees), pre and post-Act comparison; difference-in-
differences  
  1994–2000
(pre-Act) 
  2000–2006
(post-Act) 
 
 Firms 1 – 9 
employees 
Firms 10+ 
employees
Difference Firms 1 – 9 
employees
Firms 10+ 
employees
Difference 
Difference 
in- 
differences
No job mobility /  
no change of 
hours1) 57.8 61.1 3.3 52.5 58.7 6.2 2.9 
Job mobility /  
no change of 
hours1) 14.6 17.2 2.6 18.1 17.6 -0.5 -3.1 
No job mobility /  
change of hours 10.9 8.6 -2.3 12.6 12.1 -0.5 1.8 
Job mobility /  
change of hours 8.4 7.9 -0.5 8.4 8.2 -0.3 0.2 
Exit from labour 
market 8.3 5.1 -3.1 8.4 3.5 -5.0 -1.9 
Total (n=835) (n=4,009)  (n=591) (n=4,847)   
1) No change or change is less than 4 hours. 
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5.2 Model estimates 
In Tables 4 and 5, we present the estimates for the multinomial logit model for 
males and females respectively. Because our main concern here is to test the effect 
of legislation on hour constraints we only discuss the effects of the relevant 
variables: firms size and preferences for working hours, and their interaction with 
time.  
 After controlling for business cycle effects, the time dummies in the model 
are indicative for changes in mobility patterns that took place after the 
introduction of the new Dutch Act for working time adjustments for employees in 
small firms.8 It shows that male employees were more likely to leave the labour 
force in the period 1986–1994 (Table 4). Male employees in medium or large sized 
firms are less likely to exit the labour market in the period 2000–2006. Both 
findings reflect the increase in average retirement age in the Netherlands since the 
1990s. Our findings do not suggest that new Dutch Act has had any significant 
effect upon facilitating hours adjustments within the job for males since the 
interaction between time and firm size dummies is insignificant in the equation for 
change of hours without job mobility.  
 Irrespective of the firm size, female employees are found to be less likely to 
leave the labour market in the period 2000–2006 compared to the period of 
reference (Table 5). This reflects the significant increase in labour force 
participation of females in the Netherlands. Females in medium sized and large 
firms more likely to display hours and job mobility simultaneously. Such mobility 
patterns, however, were significantly less frequent in the pre-Act period. With 
respect to the change of working hours within the same job, we find – as was the 
case with males – no differences across firm size, nor do we find significant effects 
for the cross-term with time (except for the time interactions in the period 1986–
1994).  
 Hence, contrary to the bivariate results in Table 3, once we control for 
observed characteristics of the employees, we do not find that employees in 
medium or large firms (where the Act applies) find it easier to change their working 
hours while remaining in their job than employees in small firms (where the Act 
does not apply). 
 
8.  Sensitivity checks showed that failing to control for the business cycle exaggerates the effect of the time dummies. 
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For both males and females, we do find that a preference for a different number of 
working hours is a strong determinant for a change in actual working hours. This 
confirms the findings from earlier Dutch research (Euwals et al., 1998; Euwals, 
2001). Male employees who are dissatisfied with their actual working hours are 
significantly more likely to change hours within their current job. The effects for 
female workers are even more pronounced. Moreover, females who are dissatisfied 
with their current number of working hours are also more likely to change their 
working hours and their job simultaneously. Under the assumption that the new 
Dutch Act has affected mobility patterns, one would expect that dissatisfied 
workers more often adapt their working hours without changing job in the post-
Act period. However, the coefficients show no significant period effects for the 
various mobility patterns neither for male nor for female employees. They are just 
as likely to change hours and job at the same time after the introduction of the Act 
as they were prior to the Act. Furthermore, dissatisfied workers are not significantly 
less likely to withdraw from the labour market in the post-Act period. 
 
Table 4 
Multinomial logit estimates for the probability of job and hours mobility between t and t + 2, male 
employees, 1986–2006 (marginal effects) 
Reference: No job mobility/ 
change of hours  
Job mobility/
no change of 
hours 
No job 
mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Job mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Exit from 
labour market
Time dummies 
(ref: 1994–2000)     
  1986–1994 -0.028 -0.001 -0.004 0.041** 
 (0.031) (0.012) (0.009) (0.020) 
  2000–2006 0.001 0.020 -0.007 0.014 
 (0.040) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020) 
Firm size (ref: < 10 employees)     
10–99 employees -0.026 -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 
 (0.029) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) 
> 99 employees -0.000 0.003 -0.006 -0.028** 
 (0.030) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
10–99 employees × 1986–1994 0.062 0.012 0.010 -0.014 
 (0.046) (0.020) (0.016) (0.009) 
10–99 employees × 2000–2006 0.008 -0.001 0.027 -0.020** 
 (0.044) (0.013) (0.029) (0.008) 
> 99 employees × 1986–1994 0.048 -0.003 0.005 -0.012 
 (0.045) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
> 99 employees × 2000–2006 0.026 -0.006 0.022 -0.018* 
 (0.047) (0.010) (0.026) (0.010) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Multinomial logit estimates for the probability of job and hours mobility between t and t + 2, male 
employees, 1986–2006 (marginal effects) 
Reference: No job mobility/ 
change of hours  
Job mobility/
no change of 
hours 
No job 
mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Job mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Exit from 
labour market
Dissatisfied with number of hours -0.011 0.024** 0.012 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) 
Dissatisfied with number of hours ×  0.011 0.002 0.003 -0.010 
1986–1994 (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Dissatisfied with number of hours ×  0.045 -0.006 0.015 -0.000 
2000–2006 (0.032) (0.007) (0.014) (0.015) 
Regional unemployment rate 0.003 -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age -0.009** -0.007*** -0.003* 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared (/100) 0.000 0.009*** 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Household type 
(ref: couple, no child)     
Couple with child younger than 6 y.o. 0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Single -0.046*** 0.003 -0.001 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) 
Educational level 
(ref: secondary education)     
Low education -0.048*** 0.004 -0.006 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
High education/university 0.030** -0.004 0.000 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Number of hours of partner 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hourly wage (log) -0.009 0.018** -0.004 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) 
Part-time job -0.110*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.049*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) 
Over time work 0.038*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Permanent contract -0.082*** -0.007 -0.036*** -0.082*** 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.013) (0.026) 
Managerial job  0.015*** -0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Heavy duty  -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Dissatisfied with job 0.096*** 0.002 0.016** 0.057*** 
 (0.020) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019) 
Sector (ref: industry and energy)     
Agriculture -0.039 0.027 0.010 -0.009 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Multinomial logit estimates for the probability of job and hours mobility between t and t + 2, male 
employees, 1986–2006 (marginal effects) 
Reference: No job mobility/ 
change of hours  
Job mobility/
no change of 
hours 
No job 
mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Job mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Exit from 
labour market
Construction -0.016 0.022** -0.011** 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) 
Commerce and catering 0.014 0.009 -0.006 -0.000 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Transport 0.009 0.001 -0.007 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) 
Financial business services 0.025 0.008 -0.002 0.007 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) 
Other services -0.015 0.019 0.013 0.002 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) 
Public sector 0.039** -0.000 -0.000 -0.019** 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Education -0.086*** 0.078*** 0.018* -0.015 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.010) (0.010) 
Healthcare -0.016 0.006 0.020* -0.011 
 (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Pseudo-R-square 0.098    
Chi-square 1752.437    
df 140    
Loglikelihood -8361.792    
N (person-time) 9033    
Number of individuals 3794    
Standard errors corrected for intragroup correlation in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 5 
Multinomial logit estimates for the probability of job and hours mobility between t and t + 2, 
female employees, 1986–2006 (marginal effects) 
Reference: 
No job mobility/change of hours  
Job mobility/
no change of 
hours 
No job 
mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Job mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Exit from 
labour market
Time dummies (ref: 1994–2000)     
1986–1994 0.011 0.006 0.031 0.044* 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.022) (0.025) 
2000–2006 0.059 -0.001 0.002 -0.043* 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) 
Firm size (ref: < 10 employees)     
10–99 employees -0.028 0.030 0.043** -0.034* 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Multinomial logit estimates for the probability of job and hours mobility between t and t + 2, 
female employees, 1986–2006 (marginal effects) 
Reference: 
No job mobility/change of hours  
Job mobility/
no change of 
hours 
No job 
mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Job mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Exit from 
labour market
> 99 employees 0.005 0.002 0.030* -0.033* 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) 
10–99 employees × 1986–1994 0.004 -0.026 -0.030*** -0.000 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.010) (0.026) 
10–99 employees × 2000–2006 -0.021 -0.001 -0.022 0.026 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.014) (0.043) 
> 99 employees × 1986–1994 -0.009 -0.040** -0.026** -0.022 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018) 
> 99 employees × 2000–2006 -0.012 0.012 -0.010 0.010 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.019) (0.036) 
Dissatisfied with number of hours -0.020 0.069*** 0.089*** 0.023 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Dissatisfied with number of hours ×  -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 
1986–1994 (0.024) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019) 
Dissatisfied with number of hours ×  -0.008 0.001 -0.016 0.018 
2000–2006 (0.025) (0.020) (0.012) (0.031) 
Regional unemployment rate 0.003 -0.003 -0.008*** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age squared (/100) -0.005 -0.001 -0.010** -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household type 
(ref: couple, no child)     
Couple with child younger than 6 y.o. -0.030** -0.026** -0.010 0.015 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
Single 0.033* -0.028** 0.004 -0.029* 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
Educational level 
(ref: secondary education)     
Low education -0.040*** 0.007 0.006 0.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) 
High education/university 0.007 0.022* 0.019** 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Multinomial logit estimates for the probability of job and hours mobility between t and t + 2, 
female employees, 1986–2006 (marginal effects) 
Reference: 
No job mobility/change of hours  
Job mobility/
no change of 
hours 
No job 
mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Job mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Exit from 
labour market
Number of hours of partner -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hourly wage (log) -0.029* 0.001 -0.018** -0.018 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) 
Part-time job -0.060*** 0.024** 0.041*** 0.036*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
Over time work 0.016 -0.010 0.009 -0.016 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) 
Permanent contract -0.039** -0.018 -0.065*** -0.117*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.025) 
Managerial job  0.013** -0.004 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Heavy duty  -0.010 -0.009 -0.011* 0.038*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) 
Dissatisfied with job 0.076*** -0.023 0.056*** 0.088*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) 
Sector (ref: industry and energy)     
Agriculture -0.082** 0.010 -0.007 0.044 
 (0.041) (0.055) (0.038) (0.054) 
Construction -0.030 0.108* 0.051 0.050 
 (0.039) (0.062) (0.034) (0.045) 
Commerce and catering -0.013 0.057** -0.002 -0.023 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.013) (0.015) 
Transport 0.028 0.019 -0.011 -0.029 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.016) (0.020) 
Financial business services 0.032 -0.013 0.004 -0.018 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) 
Other services -0.004 0.052* 0.014 -0.013 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018) 
Public sector 0.033 0.007 -0.001 -0.031* 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) 
Education -0.010 0.061** -0.002 -0.049*** 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.015) (0.017) 
Healthcare -0.015 0.040* 0.005 -0.039** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Multinomial logit estimates for the probability of job and hours mobility between t and t + 2, 
female employees, 1986–2006 (marginal effects) 
Reference: 
No job mobility/change of hours  
Job mobility/
no change of 
hours 
No job 
mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Job mobility/ 
change of 
hours 
Exit from 
labour market
Pseudo-R-square 0.072    
Chi-square 1054.396    
df 140    
Loglikelihood -7788.988    
N (person-time) 6095    
Number of individuals 2902    
Standard errors corrected for intragroup correlation in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
Having found no significant effects of the new Dutch legislation, it is important to 
investigate how sensitive our findings are to the choices made in our models.9 A 
first issue is that while the law only applies to employees with a tenure of more 
than one year, we tested its effects on all employees irrespective of the tenure 
length. However, restricting our sample to employees who have been with their 
current employer for more than twelve months does not change our results.  
 A second potential problem is that in our analyses we have not made the 
distinction between job mobility with another employer and job mobility within 
the same firm. This could potentially bias our difference-in-differences estimator, 
both because the law applies to within firm hours changes and because the 
opportunities for within firm mobility are greater in large firms than in small firms. 
Restricting our measure of mobility to capture only changes of employer does not 
lead us to reach other conclusions with respect to the effects of the legislation. Male 
and female workers in lager firms (compared to small firms) do not find it easier to 
change their hours within the same firm after the legislation came into force. 
Neither are they less likely to change hours and job simultaneously in the post 
                                           
9.   Since we do find any effect of the law we do not need to worry about possible underestimation of the standard 
error of our difference-in-differences estimator (Bertand et al., 2004). 
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legislation period. The effect of the dissatisfaction with the working hours is also 
not different in the pre and post legislation period. 
 A third potential issue is that while the legislation does apply to any change 
in the labour supply (either more or fewer hours), its effect could well be different 
for employees wanting to increase their labour supply compared to employees 
wanting to reduce it. If this is indeed the case, our analyses would fail to pick up 
this differential effect. We estimated two additional models: the first model focuses 
on the likelihood to increase the number of hours worked, while the second focuses 
on reduction of the number of hours worked. Our main findings remain the same 
for both males and females in the model where we restrict our measure of mobility 
to only account for increases in the labour supply. For male workers the difference-
in-differences estimator does not change either when our measure of mobility only 
accounts for a reduction in the labour supply. For female workers in medium-sized 
firms, we do find that they are significantly less likely to reduce their number of 
working hours in conjunction with job mobility in the post-Act period compared 
to workers in small firms. However, this finding also holds for the pre-Act period 
(1986–1994). Henceforth, this change in mobility pattern cannot directly be 
linked to the new Act.  
 A fourth potential issue is that unobserved individual characteristics could 
affect our findings. Correcting for unobserved heterogeneities could be of 
importance because one could argue that the intrinsic characteristics and 
motivations of workers who display the various types of mobility are different. For 
example, one could contend that workers who manage to change their hours 
without displaying job mobility are more assertive or are more skillful in 
negotiating with their employer. Elsewhere, we estimated a panel multinomial logit 
models on the data for the period 1986–2002 and we showed that unobserved 
heterogeneity only affects the mobility pattern of males in the job mobility/no 
change of hours equation and the mobility pattern of female in the job 
mobility/change of hours equation (Fouarge and Baaijens, 2004). Moreover, 
correcting for unobserved characteristics does not affect our findings.  
 Finally, in our study, the period following the introduction of the new 
Adjustment of Working Hours Act amounts to six years. However, it is possible 
that such a law has a one-off effect with the stock of employees unhappy about 
their number of hours take the opportunity of changing their labour supply shortly 
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after the introduction of the law. Although we expect this behaviour to show in our 
findings, we replicated our analysis while restricting the post-Act period to the two 
and four years following the new law. None of these restrictions changed our 
findings. 
 
 
6 Discussion 
A large body of literature shows that changes in working hours often coincide with 
job mobility. This means that labour demand constraints affect the probability of 
adjusting the number of working hours. With the introduction of the Adjustment 
of Working Hours Act in 2000 – the Act gives a formal right to employees to 
adapt the length of their working week within their current job – Dutch policy 
makers expected to smooth away such labour demand constraints. Such 
institutions aiming at facilitating working time transitions have received a great 
deal of attention lately (see, for example, O’Reilly, 2003).  
 With the new Act we expected adjustments of working hours to be less often 
realized by means of job mobility. Descriptive findings indicate that changes of 
hours within the job indeed appear to have increased. However, using employees in 
small firms as a control group – the Act does not apply to small firms – and 
applying a difference-in-differences methodology, our econometric model suggests 
no such effect. Employees in large firms (whether male or female) do not find it 
easier to change their working hours while remaining in their job in the post-Act 
period. Likewise, for male and female workers who are dissatisfied with their 
number of working hours – the target group of this new Act – we found no 
significant effect of the legislation. They are equally likely to change hours and job 
or to exit the labour market and, more importantly, no more likely to change hours 
without changing job after the introduction of the Act than prior to the Act. This 
finding is not sensitive to key modelling choices made for our analysis. In 
particular, whether we consider increases or decreases in the number of working 
hours, no effect is found. 
 Although the Dutch labour market, with its large part-time segment, is a 
particular one, it does not stand alone in Europe. Germany, the UK, Sweden and 
Denmark, for example, also have a large proportion of part-time employment. 
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Despite this apparent working time flexibility, hours changes within the job still 
seem to be difficult in the Netherlands, and the recently introduced Adjustment of 
Working Hours Act has not changed this situation. In Germany where a similar 
law – the Act on Part-time Work and Fixed-term Contracts – was introduced in 
2001, the relation between working time reduction and job mobility has not 
changed either (Munz, 2004). 
 What lessons can be learned from the Dutch experience? It is possible that 
the positive effects of such policy measures will only become apparent in the longer 
run. It could be that the new legislation will induce a further ‘normalisation’ of 
part-time employment, and more transitions between full-time and part-time jobs 
during the course of the working life. However, it is difficult to evaluate such long-
term effects because it can also come from other sorts of contextual changes that 
one cannot control for. For example, in the longer run, employers could change 
their production technology in order to allow for greater flexibility. 
 Previous research has shown that many employees with a desire to adjust 
working hours are reluctant to put forward such requests. Employees (especially 
male employees) see their employer and the nature of their job as important 
obstacles in realising a preference for working a different number of hours. They 
seem to fear that their employer will not approve or to think that it is not possible 
in their job, although this may not objectively be the case. Furthermore, requests 
that have been put forward, seem to be reasonably successful. This indicates also 
that before the introduction of the Adjustment of Working Hours Act many 
employees succeeded in adjusting working hours. 
 Over the years, employers in the Netherlands have understood the 
advantages of part-time employment as a form of flexible labour, and as a way of 
increasing labour supply in a situation of shortages in the labour market. 
Nevertheless, both employer and employee behaviour are likely to be different in 
the various phases of the business cycle, which might explain why the new Act has 
had no measurable effect. When the labour market is tight, an employer will be 
more willing to grant an employee’s request for a change in working hours rather 
than see him or her leave the firm for another job with the preferred number of 
working hours. Under these conditions employers and employees will often 
manage to work out a solution that benefits both, and there is no need for 
legislation. In economic downturn, employers would be happy to decrease the 
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number of working hours of employees. However, employees can be expected to be 
reluctant addressing issues of adjustments of working hours: on the one hand, there 
is little scope for increases in working hours and, on the other hand, requesting a 
reduction in working hours would be issuing a wrong signal to one’s employer.  
 Nevertheless, although we find no measurable effect of the Dutch Act this 
does not make it a useless instrument. Even though some employees manage quite 
well with their employer in setting the working hours in accordance to their 
preferences and family needs, those working for profit-maximizing employers who 
are unwilling to change the labour contract because this flexibility in the working 
hours does not benefit them might be less lucky. For them, the legislation might 
prove to be useful. In this sense the Adjustment of Working Hours Act could 
function as ‘the big stick’ for employers and employees to solve problems around 
adjustment of working hours in a way that is satisfying for all parties. After all, 
employers know that if they react in an unreasonable way to any request for 
adjustment of working hours, employees can take the matter to court. At the same 
time, neither party has an interest in letting it come that far, for in general, a 
lawsuit disrupts the relationship between employer and employee severely. 
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